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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-2411 
_____________ 
  
THOMAS D. KIMMETT, 
                                  Appellant 
  
v. 
  
TOM CORBETT; BRIAN NUTT;  
WILLIAM RYAN; STEVE BRANDWENE;  
MIKE ROMAN; JILL KEISER; 
 PENNSYLVANIA OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL;  
JOHN DOES 1-10; LOU ROVELLI  
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 4-08-cv-01496) 
District Judge: Hon. Matthew W. Brann 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 7, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, SHWARTZ, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 28, 2014) 
______________ 
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______________ 
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Thomas Kimmett claims that Thomas Corbett, Brian Nutt, William Ryan, Stephen 
Brandwene, Michael Roman, Jill Keiser, and Louis Rovelli (collectively, the 
“Defendants”) violated his First Amendment rights by failing to promote him and 
ultimately terminating his employment at Pennsylvania’s Office of Attorney General 
(“OAG”) in retaliation for his reporting alleged wrongdoing and mismanagement in the 
OAG and the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue (“DOR”).  The District Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Defendants.  We will affirm. 
I. Background 
 A. The Financial Enforcement Section 
 The Financial Enforcement Section (“FES”) is a section in OAG’s Civil Law 
Division.  The FES collects debts owed to various Commonwealth entities.  It is 
comprised of the Law unit and the Administrative Collections unit (“ACU”).  The Law 
unit handles bankruptcy cases and certain collection matters.  The ACU collects debts 
owed to state entities, including the DOR.  If the FES collection efforts fail, these 
uncollected debts are referred to private collection agencies (“PCAs”).  The ACU 
manages PCA contracts, receives payments from the PCAs, and pays PCAs commissions 
on debts they collect.  Occasionally, debtors whose accounts are referred to PCAs pay the 
“client” agency directly.  In these so-called “pay direct” cases, the ACU pays the PCA its 
commission and then bills the appropriate client agency.  
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 B. Kimmett’s Tenure at FES 
 Before Kimmett was hired as the ACU Supervisor, problems were uncovered.  For 
example, the software system used to manage accounts was found to be inadequate, 
requiring employees to use manual processes for many collection tasks.  In addition, PCA 
contracts contained inconsistent language and contractual terms concerning the PCAs’ 
obligations to pay interest on amounts held for the Commonwealth and terms requiring 
audits of PCAs’ financial statements were not enforced.   
 In light of these problems, Executive Deputy Attorney General Rovelli, the 
Director of the Civil Law Division,
1
 hired Kimmett, who had both a legal and accounting 
background, as a Senior Deputy Attorney General to manage the ACU.  Kimmett was 
expected to “manage administrative collections,” address “the breakdown in the fund 
flow,” and “modernize the operation.”  App. 65.  According to Kimmett, his “marching 
orders” were to “review all aspects of [the FES] and identify any problems, issues, 
improprieties, etc. that exi[s]t in the operation.”  App. 566.  To reach this goal, Kimmett 
sought to complete a “cradle-to-grave review of the FES collection operation” and hoped 
to “[d]evelop better working relationships with state-agencies.”  App. 465.  Day-to-day, 
Kimmett was responsible for managing PCA contracts, developing procedures for the 
review and approval of commission payments, including “pay directs,” reviewing and 
approving certain settlements with debtors (“compromises”), working with other state 
                                              
 
1
 Rovelli reported to Ryan, who, as the First Deputy Attorney General, was 
directly below Attorney General Corbett in the OAG chain of command.  Ryan oversaw 
all legal and administrative matters on the law side of the OAG.  Corbett’s Chief of Staff, 
Nutt, also reported directly to Corbett.  Nutt was not directly responsible for any part of 
the Civil Law Division, including the FES.  
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agencies, especially the DOR, and addressing legal issues relating to his unit’s work.  
Kimmett supervised a staff of eight to twelve people, including Jill Keiser,
2
 and reported 
to Brandwene, the FES Chief.   
 Kimmett claims he discovered evidence of mismanagement, improprieties, and 
malfeasance in both the FES and the DOR.  As to the FES, Kimmett claimed that: (1) 
FES employees destroyed accounting documents; (2) certain FES and DOR employees 
treated PCAs too favorably by allowing them to collect commissions on accounts for 
which they did no work and withhold interest on amounts they collected; and (3) the FES 
collection process was slow and inefficient.  As to the DOR, Kimmett claimed that it: (1) 
refused to collect certain fees from debtors as required by law; (2) authorized an unearned 
payment of approximately $300,000 to a PCA; (3) approved unjustified debt 
compromises; and (4) approved certain compromises that allowed debtors to circumvent 
the DOR appeals process.   
 Kimmett claims that he raised these concerns within and outside of his chain of 
command,
3
 as well as to an Assistant United States Attorney, an FBI agent, a former 
colleague who worked at the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency, and 
the Executive Director of the Team Pennsylvania Foundation (“non-OAG/DOR 
individuals”).  There is no evidence that Defendants knew of Kimmett’s conversations 
with these non-OAG/DOR individuals.  
                                              
 
2
 Keiser was the ACU Supervisor before Kimmett.  After Kimmett’s hiring, she 
was below Kimmett in the chain of command.  The record does not disclose retaliatory 
acts she purportedly took against him. 
 
3
 Nutt was outside of Kimmett’s chain of command. 
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 Kimmett claims Defendants ignored these issues, and, in retaliation for his 
complaints, declined to promote him to FES Chief when Brandwene retired.  Instead, the 
OAG hired Michael Roman as FES Chief.   
 Roman and Rovelli grew increasingly dissatisfied with Kimmett’s performance.  
They claimed that they received complaints that Kimmett frequently and needlessly 
rejected compromises, harshly treated his staff, and consistently failed to follow protocol 
when communicating with DOR employees.  In June 2008, Roman and Rovelli removed 
Kimmett from a large software project that he had spearheaded.  Rovelli and Roman also 
voiced their concerns about Kimmett to Ryan and the three of them decided to transfer 
Kimmett to the Law unit.  
 In August 2008, Kimmett filed a federal Complaint, asserting that Corbett, Nutt, 
Ryan, Ravelli, Brandwene, and Roman and certain high-level employees at the DOR 
failed to promote him in retaliation for his complaints of wrongdoing in the collection 
process and that they failed to investigate this “illegal misconduct” for “purely political 
purposes.”  App. 220-21.  Kimmett also alleged that DOR employees “participated in the 
unlawful actions of the other defendants, including Corbett, in unlawfully covering up the 
illegal activities” and engaged in the “conspiratorial destruction of [Kimmett’s] 
promotional opportunities.”  App. 230.   
 According to Rovelli, the lawsuit damaged Kimmett’s working relationships with 
his supervisors and the DOR, and his allegations of criminal behavior by Corbett and 
DOR employees led Rovelli to conclude that Kimmett could not litigate in the name of 
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the Attorney General or on behalf of the DOR.  As a result, the plan to transition 
Kimmett to the Law unit was abandoned.   
 In November 2008, Kimmett received his second annual performance evaluation.
4
  
The evaluation criticized his allegedly unwarranted disapprovals of compromises, failure 
to complete the software project, and negative attitude.  The evaluation also included a 
remedial plan that required Kimmett to work closely with Roman on all proposed 
compromises to ensure that Kimmett was acting reasonably. 
 In his response to the evaluation, Kimmett stated that: (1) he believed that “the 
entire evaluation [was] inappropriate because it is part of an orchestrated and deliberate 
effort” by OAG staff to “discredit” him since his lawsuit, App. 331; (2) he found it 
“surreal” that individuals he sued were the same individuals reviewing him, App. 331; (3) 
Roman “was placed in [the position of Chief of the FES] to stifle and curtail any further 
investigations . . . and to fabricate and trump up charges against [him],” App. 333; and 
(4) while he welcomed an inquiry into compromise practices, such an examination could 
not “be performed by Roman or anyone in the Civil Law Division in a fair and unbiased 
way and not become a backdoor attempt to fabricate charges against [him].”  App. 334. 
 Rovelli viewed Kimmett’s response as “unmeasured and intemperate” and showed 
an unwillingness to accept supervision and a refusal to cooperate with the remedial plan.  
App. 910-12.  Rovelli recommended that Corbett terminate Kimmett.  After a meeting 
                                              
 
4
 The evaluation was written three days before Kimmett filed his Complaint, but 
its delivery was delayed until November 2008 by agreement of Kimmett’s trial counsel 
and the OAG.   
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with Rovelli, Ryan, and Nutt, Corbett approved Rovelli’s recommendation and 
terminated Kimmett.   
 After his termination, Kimmett filed an Amended Complaint alleging, among 
other things, that the Defendants retaliated against him in violation of the First 
Amendment by failing to promote him and by terminating his employment.
5
  After 
discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  The District Court 
granted Defendants’ motion and held that, while portions of Kimmett’s speech were 
made as a citizen and addressed matters of public concern, Defendants were nevertheless 
entitled to summary judgment because the OAG’s interest in workplace harmony 
outweighed Kimmett’s and the public’s interest in Kimmett’s speech.6  Kimmett appeals 
the District Court’s order granting Defendants’ motion.7 
                                              
 
5
 Kimmett’s free speech claim was brought under the First Amendment’s Speech 
Clause and his allegation of retaliation for filing his lawsuit is based on its Petition 
Clause.  The standards applicable to each type of protected conduct are similar.  Borough 
of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct 2488, 2494-95 (2011). 
 
6
 The District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Kimmett’s 
Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law and defamation claims.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 
 
7
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a District 
Court’s order granting summary judgment.  Jacobs Constructors, Inc. v. NPS Energy 
Servs., Inc., 264 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2001).  Summary judgment is appropriate “if the 
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  In reaching this decision, 
the Court must determine “whether the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
admissions on file, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
whether the moving party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC, 675 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Celotex Corp. 
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).   
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II. Discussion 
 To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a public employee must 
demonstrate that: (1) he or she engaged in activity that is protected by the First 
Amendment, and (2) the protected activity was a substantial factor in the employer’s 
retaliatory action.  Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 2009).  “The first 
factor is a question of law; the second factor is a question of fact.”8  Id. (quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  “If these two elements are satisfied, the burden shifts to the 
defendants to demonstrate that the same action would occur if the speech had not 
occurred.”  Id. 
  The Court proceeds through three steps to ascertain whether a public employee’s 
speech is protected by the First Amendment.  First, the Court must determine whether the 
employee’s speech was made pursuant to his or her official duties, which would not be 
protected by the First Amendment, or whether it was made as a citizen, which would be 
protected by the First Amendment.
9
  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).  
Second, if the speech was not made pursuant to an employee’s official duties, the Court 
                                              
 
8
 Summary judgment is appropriate if a plaintiff fails to adduce sufficient evidence 
on one of the factors typically reserved for the jury.  See Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 
F.3d 118, 127 (3d Cir. 2005).  Here, Kimmett has adduced no evidence establishing that 
Defendants were aware of the communications he made to the non-OAG/DOR 
individuals. Thus, these communications could not have been a substantial or motivating 
factor in the alleged retaliatory actions.  Ambrose v. Twp. of Robinson, 303 F.3d 488, 
493 (3d Cir. 2002).  For this reason, summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to 
these communications is appropriate. 
 
9
 If an employee’s speech was made pursuant to his official duties, “we need not 
examine whether [his] speech passes the [second and third steps, which were] established 
by [Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968),] and its progeny.”  Foraker v. 
Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 243 (3d Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Borough of 
Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011). 
 9 
 
considers whether “the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.”  Id. at 
418.  Third, if the answer to that question is yes, the Court must determine “whether the 
relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee 
differently from any other member of the general public.”  Id.  When making this 
determination, the Court attempts to “‘balance . . . the interests of the [employee], as a 
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an 
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.’”  Id. (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568). 
 A. Citizen Speech or Pursuant to Employment Duties 
 While the Supreme Court has not articulated a “comprehensive framework for 
defining the scope of an employee’s duties,” it has held that the “proper inquiry is a 
practical one.”  Id. at 424-25.  When making this “practical” inquiry, the Court examines, 
among other things: (1) whether the employee’s speech relates to “‘special knowledge’ or 
‘experience’ acquired through his job,” Gorum, 561 F.3d at 185 (citing Foraker, 501 F.3d 
at 240); (2) whether the employee raises complaints or concerns about issues relating to 
his job duties “up the chain of command” at his workplace, Foraker, 501 F.3d at 241; (3) 
whether the speech fell within the employee’s designated responsibilities, Gorum, 561 
F.3d at 186;
10
 and (4) whether the employee’s speech is in furtherance of his designated 
duties, even if the speech at issue is not part of them.  See Foraker, 501 F.3d at 243. 
                                              
 
10
 While a formal job description is not dispositive for determining whether the 
employee’s acts were “within the scope of [his] professional duties for First Amendment 
purposes,” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425, we examine it to determine if it accurately describes 
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 In this case, Kimmett’s conduct can be divided into three categories: (1) the filing 
of this lawsuit; (2) communications with others at the OAG; and (3) communications 
with DOR employees or about DOR issues.  While the first category of speech—the 
current lawsuit—is outside of Kimmett’s job duties, Kimmett’s speech in the last two 
categories was a part of his job duties.  
  1. Communications within the OAG 
 Kimmett’s speech within the OAG was made pursuant to his job duties as the 
ACU Supervisor.  First, much of the speech that Kimmett points to was made directly to 
his immediate supervisor about the unit.  Because this speech was made up the chain of 
command and related to his employment duties, it was pursuant to his job duties.  See 
Foraker, 501 F.3d at 241.  Second, his speech to Nutt and to individuals higher in the 
chain of command related to the treatment of PCAs, the FES collection process, the 
approval of compromises, and document destruction by FES employees before he was 
hired.  As the ACU Supervisor, Kimmett was directly responsible for managing the PCA 
contracts, the FES collection process, the compromise process, and subordinates within 
ACU.  Accordingly, this speech was pursuant to his job duties, and, thus, cannot provide 
a basis for relief under the First Amendment.  See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (“[W]hen 
public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not 
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not 
                                                                                                                                                  
the employee’s duties, and, if so, we will consider the job description when determining 
whether the employee spoke pursuant to those duties.  See Gorum, 561 F.3d at 186.  
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insulate their communications from employer discipline.”).  Thus, summary judgment in 
favor of the Defendants on this speech was appropriate. 
  2. Speech to DOR Employees or about DOR Issues 
 Kimmett’s job required him to work closely with the DOR and other agencies that 
referred debts to the ACU.  The ACU was required to review proposed compromises 
from other agencies and to pay commissions to PCAs after a “direct pay” from a debtor 
to the agency.  Because Kimmett worked closely with other agencies, he frequently 
gained information about their internal operations, much of which was relevant to his 
duties as the ACU Supervisor.   
 Most of the speech that Kimmett points to relates to the payment of an 
unauthorized PCA commission and problems with certain debt compromises.  These 
areas fall within Kimmett’s express duties as the ACU Supervisor.  Moreover, to the 
extent that his complaints about the DOR concerned subjects that fell outside of his 
express duties, Kimmett learned about them through his close working relationship with 
the DOR.  Further, because the ACU worked so closely with the DOR, any impropriety 
or mismanagement at the DOR would necessarily affect the efficient operation of the 
ACU.  Thus, Kimmett’s communications regarding the problems at the DOR relate to his 
“special knowledge” of the DOR’s operations that he obtained by virtue of his position at 
the FES, see Gorum, 561 F.3d at 185-86, and were in furtherance of his managerial duties 
in the ACU.  See Foraker, 501 F.3d at 243.  For these reasons, his speech to DOR 
employees or concerning DOR issues was within his job duties and, under Garcetti and 
Foraker, the allegedly retaliatory responses could not give rise to a First Amendment 
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claim, and thus, summary judgment on this speech in favor of the Defendants was 
appropriate. 
 B. Matter of Public Concern 
 Since Kimmett’s lawsuit is the only activity that could potentially be protected, we 
must next determine whether the lawsuit relates to a matter of public concern.  An 
employee’s speech “implicates a matter of public concern if the content, form, and 
context establish that the speech involves a matter of political, social, or other concern to 
the community.”  Miller v. Clinton Cnty., 544 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir. 2008); see also 
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983) (noting that speech that “bring[s] to light 
actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust” is a matter of public concern); 
Czurlanis v. Albanese, 721 F.2d 98, 104 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that allegations of 
“inefficient, wasteful, and possibly fraudulent” government practices are matters of 
public concern).  As Defendants concede, Defendants Br. 32, Kimmett’s lawsuit 
concerned allegations of actual or potential wrongdoing on the part of the OAG and 
hence it relates to matters of public concern. 
 C. Pickering Balancing 
 This Court must next determine whether Kimmett’s “interest in the speech 
outweighs any potential disruption of the work environment and decreased efficiency in 
the office.”  Curinga v. City of Clairton, 357 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2004).11  If it does 
not, then Kimmett’s speech is not protected by the First Amendment.  Id. at 314.   
                                              
 
11
 Defendants argue that this Court should apply the holdings of two First 
Amendment freedom of association cases, Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), and 
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 When evaluating the disruption, we consider “whether the statement impairs 
discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on close 
working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or 
impedes the performance of the speaker’s duties or interferes with the regular operation 
of the enterprise,” Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987), as well as “the 
hierarchical proximity of the criticizing employee to the person or body criticized.”  
Baldassare v. State of N.J., 250 F.3d 188, 199 (3d Cir. 2001) (quotation and citation 
omitted). 
 Courts must also bear in mind that an employee who “accurately exposes rampant 
corruption” will no doubt cause a workplace disruption.  O’Donnell v. Yanchulis, 875 
F.2d 1059, 1062 (3d Cir. 1989) (citation and quotation marks omitted).  In such a case, 
given the public’s strong interest in legitimate whistleblowing, it would be “absurd to 
hold that the First Amendment generally authorizes corrupt officials to punish 
subordinates who blow the whistle simply because the speech somewhat disrupted the 
office . . . .”  O’Donnell, 875 F.2d at 1062 (3d Cir. 1989) (citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  Thus, the mere existence of a workplace disruption may not be sufficient to 
overcome the employee’s interest.  Czurlanis, 721 F.2d at 107.  Instead, a public 
                                                                                                                                                  
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), wherein the Supreme Court explained that a public 
employer may dismiss an employee in a policymaking position based on political 
affiliation.  See Curinga, 357 F.3d at 310.  Because this is not a freedom of association 
case, we do not explicitly consider Elrod and Branti, but when conducting the Pickering 
balance, we do consider the responsibility and authority attendant to Kimmett’s position 
as the ACU Supervisor, and whether it “required confidentiality and a close working 
relationship” with policymakers.  Id. at 313. 
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employer must tolerate a workplace disruption so long as it is “directly proportional to 
the importance of the disputed speech to the public.”  Miller, 544 F.3d at 549 n.2. 
 Kimmett’s lawsuit publicly accused his entire chain of command and staff at the 
DOR with whom he worked with “unlawfully covering up . . . illegal activities” for 
“purely political purposes.”  App. 221, 230.  These allegations of politically motivated 
illegal behavior would certainly “impair[] discipline” and “harmony among co-workers,” 
Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388, at the OAG, particularly with Kimmett’s immediate supervisors, 
Rovelli and Roman, see Baldassare, 250 F.3d at 200; Roseman v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., at 
Ind., 520 F.2d 1364, 1368 (3d Cir. 1975) (affirming dismissal of First Amendment claim 
when speaker’s expression “called into question the integrity of the person immediately 
in charge of running a department”), as well as the DOR.  Indeed, his supervisors 
confirmed as much when Rovelli testified that Kimmett’s lawsuit damaged his working 
relationships in the OAG and the DOR and when they cancelled plans to move Kimmett 
to the Law unit.   
 Moreover, Kimmett himself stated that even being reviewed by his supervisors 
was “inappropriate because it [was] part of an orchestrated and deliberate effort” by OAG 
staff to “discredit” him since his lawsuit.  App. 331.  In addition, even though he was 
required to work with Roman on compromises pursuant to his remedial plan, he claimed 
that, in light of the lawsuit, a review of the compromise process could not “be performed 
by Roman or anyone in the Civil Law Division in a fair and unbiased way and not 
become a backdoor attempt to fabricate charges against [him].”  App. 334.  Hence, 
according to Kimmett, because of his lawsuit, it was “inappropriate” for his supervisors 
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to review his work and he could not complete one of his assigned tasks in the remedial 
plan.  For this reason, and as the District Court found, Kimmett’s own statements 
demonstrate that his lawsuit “impair[ed] discipline by superiors,” had “a detrimental 
impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are 
necessary,” and “impede[d] the performance of the speaker’s duties or interfere[d] with 
the regular operation of the enterprise.”  Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388.  While the public has a 
“significant interest in legitimate whistleblowing,” the extent of the disruption caused by 
Kimmett’s allegations in his lawsuit tilts the Pickering balance in favor of Defendants.  
As a result, his First Amendment retaliation claim fails and summary judgment was 
appropriate.     
III. Conclusion 
 For these reasons, we will affirm. 
